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TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION:  
COMMUNITY-WIDE OR INTERNATIONAL? 
THE SAGA CONTINUES 
IRENE CALBOLI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While the exclusive rights of use of a trademark entitle an owner to 
prevent third parties from using identical or similar marks in relation to 
identical or similar products without his consent, these rights are qualified by 
the principle of “exhaustion,” also known as the “first-sale rule.”1  According 
to this principle, “[t]he right of a producer to control distribution of its 
trademarked products does not extend beyond the first sale of the product,” 
and “[r]esale by the first purchaser of the original article under the producer‟s 
trademark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition.”2  These 
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Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law from Bologna University Law School and an 
L.L.M from the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.  Dr. 
Calboli would like to thank Professor Vito M. Mangini, Bologna University Law School, and Dr. 
Spyros M. Maniatis, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London, for their help and 
comments during the preparation of this Article.  Additional thanks are due to Dean Howard 
Eisenberg and Associate Dean Shirley Wiegand, Marquette University Law School, and the 
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review staff, and especially Peter T. Holsen, Editor-in-Chief. 
1. See generally Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel Imports Through 
Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999); Roland Michael Beckmann, Die Reichweite des 
Erschöpfungsgrundsatzes nach neuem Markenrecht, 11 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 836 (1998); Gallus Joller, 
Zur territorialen Reichweite des Erschöpfungsgrundsatzes im Markenrecht, 10 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 751 
(1998); Gallus Joller, Markenrecht und freier Warenverkehr, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 309 (1998); 
Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 28 I.I.C. 623 (1997); Ulrich 
Löwenheim, Nationale und Internationale Erschöpfung von Schutzrechten im Wandel der Zeiten, 4 
G.R.U.R. INT‟L 307 (1996); Charles Worth, Free Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights 
Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the 
Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 1988 WORLD COMPETITION 
75; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); 
Friedrich-Karl Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48 (1970). 
2. Sebastian Int‟l v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1720, 1722 (9th Cir. 1995), quoted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION 25:41 (2001).  According to the Ninth Circuit, “the premise of the first sale is 
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limits on exclusive trademark rights are founded in the interests of free trade 
and the free movement of goods.  Such limits are justified by the concept that 
trademarks must not be used as tools of distribution, marketing policy, or as a 
means for market division, in a way that counters their function as distinctive 
indicators of origin.
3
 
From a legal standpoint, the definition of an exhaustion regime depends 
upon the recognition of this principle by national trademark laws and upon the 
determination of the geographical area over which the principle is to apply.
4
  
Traditionally, national practices have been characterized by two distinct 
approaches: “national exhaustion” and “international exhaustion.”5   
Under national exhaustion, once the trademarked products are placed on 
the market by the owner, or with his consent, the owner‟s rights are 
considered exhausted only in the domestic territory.  The owner will still be 
free to oppose the importation of genuine goods bearing his trademark that 
have been put on the market outside the domestic territory.
6
  In contrast, under 
international exhaustion, if a trademark owner, or someone with his consent, 
places the trademarked goods on the market in any of the national 
jurisdictions where the trademark owner enjoys protection, the owner‟s rights 
are exhausted in other national jurisdictions where he enjoys similar rights.  
 
that „the consumer gets exactly what the consumer bargains for, the genuine product of the particular 
producer.‟”  MCCARTHY, supra, § 25:41 n.4 (quoting Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1075 (2001)). 
3. Even though trademarks perform a variety of functions in modern society, their primary 
function, from a legal standpoint, is still as indicators of commercial origin.  See generally W. R. 
CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 612 (4th ed. 1996); Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the 
Economics of Trade Marks, in ADRAIN STERLING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & MARKET FREEDOM 
65 (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1997); Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A 
Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406 (1993); Nicholas S. 
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988); Sidney A. Diamond, 
The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975); Frank I. Schechter, 
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927) (stating that the “proper 
function of a trademark” is “to identify the origin or ownership of goods to which it is affixed”). This 
is reflected in most modern trademark legislation and has been affirmed in the wording of Directive 
89/104/EEC (recital 10
th
 to the Directive states that “the function [of a trademark] is in particular to 
guarantee the trademark as an indicator of origin”) and in the European Court of Justice‟s case law.  
See Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191 and Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki 
Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1999 R.P.C. 117. 
4. See S. K. Verma, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 I.I.C. 534, 539 (1998). 
5. On the differences between national and international exhaustion, see generally Jesper 
Rasmussen, The Principle of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights Pursuant to Directive 89/104 (and 
Regulation 40/94), 4 E.I.P.R. 174 (1995); Herman Cohen Jehoram, International Exhaustion versus 
Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‟L 280 (1996). 
6. Verma, supra note 4, at 539. On the difference between importation of genuine goods and 
of materially different products, see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 29:46, :48 to :50, :51.2. 
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Accordingly, the trademark owner will not be free to prevent international 
importation of genuine products bearing his trademark.
7
 
Because of its impact on the control of economic distribution, issues 
regarding trademark exhaustion have been at the center of discussion in 
Europe since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome.  In the formative years of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Community 
Commission (the “Commission”) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
argued that the exclusive rights afforded by national laws to trademark owners 
could be an obstacle to the creation of a unified internal market.  This resulted 
in the development of the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion,
8
 a 
regional compromise between national and international exhaustion.   
According to the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion, once a product 
has been put on the market in a particular Member State, by or with the 
consent of the legitimate trademark owner, the owner can no longer rely on 
his national rights to prevent the importation of the product from that State 
into another Member State.   
To approximate the laws of Member States relating to trademarks, the 
Community-wide exhaustion criterion was eventually incorporated into 
Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of December 21, 1988 
(the “Trademark Directive”).9  The adoption of the Agreement for the 
 
7. Verma, supra note 4, at 539. 
8. On the development of the principle of Community-wide exhaustion, see generally,  
Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising Intellectual Property Law Within the European Community, 
23 I.I.C. 622 (1992); Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial Property and the Free Movement of Goods in 
the Internal European Market, 21 I.I.C. 131 (1990); Vito M. Mangini, Competition and Monopoly in 
Trademark Law: An EEC Perspective, 11 I.I.C. 591 (1980); Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Doctrine of 
Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law—Scope and Limits, 10 I.I.C. 20 (1979); Friedrich-Karl Beier, 
Trademark Conflicts in the Common Market: Can They be Solved by Means of Distinguishing 
Additions?, 9 I.I.C. 221 (1978); Ulrich Löwenheim, Trademark and European Community Law, 9 
I.I.C. 422 (1978); Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The Function of Trade Marks and the Free Movement of 
Goods in the European Economic Community, 7 I.I.C. 27 (1976); Willem Mak, Trademarks and the 
European Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975).  The ECJ developed the principle of Community-wide 
exhaustion independently of the exhaustion regimes adopted by European Member States at the 
national level. The laws of some countries, such as Germany, the Benelux Countries, Austria, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, generally accepted the principle of “international exhaustion,” while 
other European jurisdictions, such as France, Italy, and Spain, opted for the principle of “national 
exhaustion.” 
9. Council Directive 89/104/EEC was adopted by the European Council on December, 21 
1988 after almost ten years of debate.  The first draft of the Directive was published in December 
1980.  Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1980 O.J. (C 351/1).  An attempted “final proposal” was 
submitted to the Council in December of 1985.  Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1985 O.J. (C 215/4). 
Following the comments of several Member States, a new text was drafted in October 1986 and 
discussed by the Working Group.  In December 1987 an amended text, strongly influenced by the 
Dutch delegation, was published and subsequently approved by the Council in June of 1988.  
Following the advice of the Economic and Social Committee in October of 1988 and the Opinion of 
the European Parliament in December of 1988, the Council adopted the Trademark Directive on 
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European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2, 1992 extended this principle to 
the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries joining the EEA 
(Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein).
10
 
However, it is unclear from the wording of the Trademark Directive 
whether the principle of Community-wide (now EEA-wide) exhaustion only 
represents a minimum standard that leaves Member States free to apply more 
generous rules (i.e., international exhaustion), or whether Community-wide 
exhaustion should be applied as the general criterion to all intra-EEA trade.  
To settle this ambiguity, the ECJ interpreted Article 7(1) of the Trademark 
Directive in two recent cases: Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft
11
 in 1998 and Sebago Inc. et. al. v. GB-Unic SA
12
 in 
1999.  The ECJ ruled that the Trademark Directive precludes national rules 
that provide for international exhaustion of trademark rights.
13
  Nevertheless, 
after considering the strong pressures coming from some Member States in 
favor of international exhaustion, the ECJ suggested that a possible remedy 
could be “to extend the exhaustion provided for by Article 7 to products put 
on the market in non-member countries by entering into international 
agreements in that sphere, as was done in the context of the EEA 
Agreement.”14  As has been noticed, such compromise could come under the 
scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement as a violation of 
the principle of “Most Favored Nation Treatment,” as per Article 4 of the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).
15
 
 
December 21, 1988.  Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40/1).  For a detailed analysis of 
the Commission‟s working documents with special attention to the drafting of Article 7, see Cohen 
Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501. 
10. Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of the Protocol to the Agreement for the European 
Economic Area (O.J.E.C. L 1/3, January 3, 1994) extended the effect of Article 7 of the Trademark 
Directive to the EEA from January 1, 1994. 
11. Case C-355/96, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp (last visited May 
3, 2002). 
12. Case C-173/98, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999). 
13. Id. 
14. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at ¶ 30. 
15. See Verma, supra note 4, at 557; Stanislaw Soltysinsky, International Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property Rights Under the TRIPS, the EC Law and the Europe Agreements, 4 G.R.U.R. 
INT‟L 316 (1996). Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “with regard to the protection of 
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the 
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of 
all other Members.”  GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
1994, art. 6.  The concern that negotiation of reciprocity agreements for the purpose of trademark 
exhaustion can come under the scope of the WTO Agreement has also been recently expressed by the 
Commission.  See generally Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights: Working Document from the 
Commission Services, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/intprop/indprop/exhaust.htm 
(December 9, 1999) [hereinafter Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion]. 
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The debate on the issue was reignited by the 1999 High Court of London 
decisions in Zino Davidoff S.A. v. AG Imports Ltd. 
16
 and Levi Strauss & Co. 
v. Tesco Stores Ltd.
17
  These cases introduced elements of the law of contracts 
and the sale of goods, and private international law into the debate.  Despite 
pressure from some Member States, in its November 2001 judgment in Zino 
Davidoff, the ECJ has continued to prevent any change towards international 
exhaustion.
18
 
The issue of trademark exhaustion has also been the subject of discussion 
within European institutions and among private trade organizations.  In April 
1999, the Commission organized two meetings with interested parties in order 
to discuss possible changes to the current regime.  As a result of these 
consultations, the Commission concluded that a shift towards international 
exhaustion would not, at least in short term, lead to a significant reduction in 
prices for consumers and decided that such a change was not appropriate for 
the time being.
19
  In March 2001, however, the European Parliament took an 
opposite approach and published a draft report on the issue, advocating the 
transition to international exhaustion.
20
  Thus far, no relevant legislative 
measures have been adopted and the debate on the issue is still open.
21
 
Following the recent ECJ case law, and in light of the overall debate on 
the issue, this Study analyzes whether, and under what conditions, a shift 
towards a regime of international exhaustion in Europe could still be possible.  
This Study focuses on an analysis of trademark exhaustion within the 
meaning of the Trademark Directive.  It does not elaborate on other issues, 
such as competition or questions on vertical restraints that are also relevant in 
the larger context of parallel trade.
22
  First, this Study will offer a description 
 
16. 30 I.I.C. 567 (1999) [hereinafter Zino Davidoff]. 
17. Unreported. 
18. Joined Cases C-414-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA  v. A & G Imports Ltd, Levi Strauss & Co. 
v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and  Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd. (Nov. 20, 2001), 
available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp [hereinafter Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases 
C-414-416/99)]. 
19. For a summary of these meetings, see Commission Working Paper on Trademark 
Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17-19. Further updates on the issue are available at the Commission‟s  
web site at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop. 
20. This unreported text was drafted by delegation members from Member States in favor of 
international exhaustion. 
21. On October 3, 2001, the European Parliament voted 473 to 22 (with 27 abstentions) in 
favor of a resolution providing for the creation of another Commission working paper about the 
exhaustion of trademark rights.  A provisional edition of the minutes of the Parliament‟s resolution 
(SEC(1999)2033 - C5-0354/2000 - 2187/2000(COS)) is available at the Community Parliament‟s 
web site (through a search in the Legislative Observatory using the Rapporteur‟s name: Mayer Hans-
Peter) at http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil (last visited May 22, 2002). 
22. From the ECJ‟s judgment in Case C-306/96, Javico Int‟l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint 
Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983, it is clear that parallel imports from a third country may, 
under certain circumstances, be acceptable under European Union competition rules.  See 
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of the development of the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion and of the 
relevant rulings of the ECJ before the adoption of the Trademark Directive.  
Next, this Study will focus on the interpretive problems of Article 7(1) of the 
Trademark Directive that have characterized the provision so far, and will 
analyze the ECJ rulings in Silhouette
23
 and Sebago.
24
  Finally, it will refer to 
the recent consultations organized by the Commission and the European 
Parliament, and to the ECJ ruling in Zino Davidoff
25
 and Levi Strauss,
26
 in 
order to draw conclusions as to the possibility of a change towards a regime of 
international exhaustion. 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF  
COMMUNITY-WIDE EXHAUSTION 
So far, the position adopted by the Community regarding the exhaustion 
of intellectual property rights has been different from other jurisdictions.  
Clearly inspired by economic liberalization, but mainly at the Community 
level, the main goal was to integrate national markets and to create a unified 
European internal market.
27
  During the years that followed the adoption of 
the Treaty of Rome, the Commission and the ECJ argued that the exclusive 
powers afforded by national law to the holder of an intellectual property right 
could not be considered “indispensable for its protection.”  Therefore, they 
argued against absolute territorial protection to prevent the hindrance of 
parallel importation within the Community.  To this end, the ECJ initially 
prohibited the exclusive use of intellectual property rights by application of 
the rules of competition set by the European Community Treaty (EC 
Treaty).
28
  Since the early 1970s, the ECJ relied more frequently on the 
 
Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 1.  For a position in favor 
of international trademark exhaustion because of its effects on free trade and world-wide 
competition, see Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International Exhaustion in the 
European Union in the Light of ―Zino Davidoff‖: Contract Versus Trade Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123, 
140 (2000); W. R. Cornish, Trade Marks: Portcullis for the EEA?, [1998] E.I.P.R. 174, 176. 
23. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at 539. 
24. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. at 1317. 
25. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 567 (1999). 
26. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), supra note 18. 
27. Verma, supra note 4, at 546; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 5, at 282. 
28. The ECJ applied the EC antitrust provisions in the leading case Costen & Grunding v. EC 
Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299.  Article 81 (ex. Article 85) of the EC Treaty states that “[t]he 
following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market.”  TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C340) (Final) (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].  Article 82 (ex. 
Article 86) provides: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
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principle of the free movement of goods, as settled in Articles 28 and 30 of 
the EC Treaty, in order to achieve the most awaited market integration.
29
 
Article 28 of the EC Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on 
importation between Member States, and other measures having an 
“equivalent effect,” in order to ensure the free movement of goods within the 
European internal market.
30
  The ECJ has held repeatedly that national 
intellectual property rights that were directed to prevent acts of importation 
may amount to measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restriction.
31
  
Accordingly, actions enforcing exclusive rights should not be allowed to 
succeed unless the actions are justified by Article 30 of the EC Treaty, which 
allows Member States to apply their national laws when protecting intellectual 
property rights.
32
  Furthermore, the ECJ has traditionally overruled national 
laws governing intellectual property rights when those laws would empower 
trademark owners to prevent parallel importation within the Community, and 
argued that the second part of Article 30 provides that domestic laws should 
not provide a means of “arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction of 
trade between Member States.”33   
 
market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.”  Id. at art. 82.  According to both 
provisions, anti-competitive behavior can consist, in particular, in 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of 
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. 
Id. 
29. For a detailed reconstruction of the ECJ‟s case law, see Guy Tritton, Articles 30 to 36 and 
Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudence of the ECJ now of an Ideal Standard?, 10 E.I.P.R. 472 
(1994). 
30. Article 28 (ex. Article 30) of the EC Treaty states that “[q]uantitative restriction on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.”  EC 
TREATY art. 28. 
31. Verma, supra note 4, at 546. 
32. Article 30 of the EC Treaty provides that 
[t]he provisions of Article 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or 
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the 
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall 
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States. 
EC TREATY art. 30. 
On the extent of this provision, see Bryan Harris, The Application of Article 36 to Intellectual 
Property (a Review of the Case Law),  1 EUR. L. REV. 515 (1976). 
33. Verma, supra note 4, at 546 (quoting EC TREATY art. 30).  For further references see also 
supra note 8. 
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These principles constitute the foundations of the doctrine of Community-
wide exhaustion and have been developed by the ECJ in several leading cases. 
A.  Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro Grossmarket 
In Deutsche Grammophon,
34
 the ECJ ruled for the first time that the 
exercise, by the owner of an intellectual property right, of the right enjoyed 
under the domestic law of a Member State to prohibit the sale in that state of a 
product protected by that right and marketed in another Member State by him 
or with his consent, was incompatible with the EC Treaty rule on the free 
movement of goods in the common market.  The ECJ analyzed the scope of 
Article 30 of the EC Treaty in order to overcome the argument that the 
provision allows restrictions on the free movement of goods for the protection 
of “industrial and commercial property.”35  The ECJ drew a distinction 
between the “existence” of the intellectual property rights and their 
“exercise.”36  While the existence of the exclusive right is determined by 
respective national laws, its exercise should be consistent with the EC 
Treaty.
37
  Accordingly, a restriction under Article 30 could only be justified to 
the extent that it aims to safeguard the “specific subject matter” of the 
intellectual property right at issue. 
B.  Centrafarm v. Winthrop 
In relation to trademarks, the ECJ clarified the meaning of the exclusive 
right‟s specific subject-matter in Centrafarm v. Winthrop.38  According to the 
ECJ, trademark rights 
guarantee that the owner of the mark has the exclusive right to use the 
mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by the trade mark 
into [the market] for the first time, and therefore was intended to 
protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage of the 
status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally 
bearing that trade mark.
39
 
 
34. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarket GmbH, 
1971 E.C.R. 487.  The distinction between the “existence” and the “exercise” of intellectual property 
rights arises from Costen & Grunding v. EC Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299.  For further analysis, see 
Georges Friden, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law: The Distinction Between 
Existence and Exercise Revisited, 26 C.M.L.R. 193 (1989). 
35. Friden, supra note 34, at 193. 
36. Id. at 194. 
37. Id. 
38. Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v.Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183. 
39. Id. at 1194.  The Court confirmed its view in Case 3/78, Centrafarm BV v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 183 and Case 1/81, Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1981 E.C.R. 2913. 
See Bryan Harris, The ―Exhaustion Principle‖ and the Centrafarm Case, 4 EUR. L. REV. 379 (1979). 
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As a result, in the case of parallel importation by independent parties 
within the Community, the ECJ held that the invocation of the right of 
exclusivity did not fall within the specific subject matter of trademark rights, 
as long as the products in question were put into the market of the Member 
State from which they were imported by the trademark owner or with his 
consent.
40
 
C.  Van Zuylen v. Hag 
In the 1970s, the ECJ was at the height of its efforts to rid the common 
market of intellectual property subdivision.  In a 1973 case, VanZulen v. Hag, 
also known as “Hag I,”41 the ECJ developed the doctrine of “common origin” 
as a complement to the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion.  According 
to this principle, when marks at issue were “sharing the same origin,” it was 
incompatible with Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty to prohibit the trading 
of the trademarked product in a Member State that was lawfully registered in 
another Member State because an identical trademark registration already 
existed in the first state.
42
  Hag I concerned two trademark registrations in 
Belgium and Germany for the decaffeinated coffee “Hag.”43  Before World 
War II, both registrations were owned by the same German company; but 
after the war, the Belgium registration was confiscated by the Belgian 
government and eventually sold to a local independent company, Van Zuylen 
Freres.
44
  According to the ECJ, in spite of the facts that the two registrations 
were actually owned by different companies and that Van Zuylen had the 
exclusive right on the trademark in Belgium, their shared “origin” was 
sufficient to allow importation into Belgium of German products bearing the 
trademark “Hag.”45 
The ECJ ruling in Hag I was heavily criticized.  It was argued that the 
ECJ had failed to address the essential function of a trademark, that is, to 
indicate the origin of a product in order to prevent any likelihood of confusion 
on the part of the public.
46
  Like the facts of Hag I, when two identical 
 
40. On these aspects, see CORNISH, supra note 3, at 646; Eike Ullmann, Reconciling Trade 
Mark Decisions of National Courts and the European Court of Justice, 27 I.I.C. 791 (1996); INGE 
GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN E.C. LAW 157 (1996); 
Ulrich Löwenheim, Intellectual Property Before the European Court of Justice, 26 I.I.C. 829 (1995); 
Giuliano Marenco & Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules on Free 
Movement: Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1990). 
41. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. For a detailed analysis of the criticisms expressed by the European legal doctrine, see 
supra note 8. For a discussion on Trademark functions, see supra note 3. 
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trademark registrations are owned by different economic entities in different 
Member States, the ECJ could not use the free movement of goods as a 
pretext to prevent the enforcement of the legitimate owner‟s exclusive rights 
against the importation of similar products bearing identical trademarks from 
another Member State.  This would be contrary to the “specific subject 
matter” of a trademark as affirmed by the ECJ,47 and as a result would 
illegitimately deprive trademark owners of their exclusive rights. 
In light of these criticisms, two years later the ECJ drew back from its 
ruling in Hag I with its decision in Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. 
Kapferer & Co.
48
  The ECJ held that Hag I’s “common origin” doctrine had 
been applied in a special case.
49
 
D.  CNL-Sucal v. Hag GF 
In 1989, fifteen years after the decision in “Hag I,” the ECJ reversed itself 
in S.A. CNL-Sucal v. Hag Gf AG.
50
  This case, known as “Hag II,” had 
identical facts as Hag I.  The ECJ confirmed that the essential function of a 
trademark, the function of indicator of commercial origin, would be 
compromised if trademark owners were not able to prevent the importation of 
products bearing marks that are identical to, or likely to be confused with, 
their own trademarks.
51
  Accordingly, and in spite of their “common origins,” 
two identical national registrations in different Member States can 
legitimately prevent the importation of trademarked products from and to 
these Member States. 
E.  IHT Internationale Heiztechnik  v. Ideal-Standard 
In 1994, the ECJ confirmed this line of reasoning in IHT Internationale 
Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH.
52
  Hag I and Hag II addressed 
the situation in which a trademark right had originally been in common 
ownership and then had been divided “involuntarily” through confiscation, 
without the original owner‟s consent.  IHT concerned a voluntary assignment 
of the trademark “Ideal Standard” to one member of the IHT group, without 
the consent of the other.
53
  According to the ECJ, such an assignment did not 
 
47. Van Zuylen Freres, 1974 E.C.R. 731. 
48. Case 119/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1039. 
49. Id. at 1062. 
50. Case C-10/89, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711. 
51. Warwick A. Rothnie, Hag II: Putting the Common Origin Doctrine to Sleep, 1 E.I.P.R. 24 
(1991); Rene Joliet & David T. Keeling, Trade Mark Law and the Free Movement of Goods: The 
Overruling of the Judgement in Hag I, 22 I.I.C. 303 (1991). 
52. Case C-9/93, 1994 E.C.R. I-2782. 
53. Id. at I-2782 to 783. 
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exhaust the trademark rights of the whole group.
54
  In particular, the ECJ held 
that the principle of exhaustion only applied 
where the owner of the trade mark in the importing state and the 
owner of the mark in the exporting State [were] the same [economic 
entity], or where, even if they [were] separate individuals, they [were] 
economically linked . . . [for example], as licensee, parent company, 
subsidiary or exclusive distributor.
55
 
Conversely, exhaustion did not apply where trademark rights had been 
assigned to an unrelated enterprise, no longer under the control of the assignor 
or any related enterprises.
56
  In the ECJ‟s view, in the absence of express or 
implied consent, the necessary grounds to invoke trademark exhaustion could 
only be found in commercial “unitary control.”57  It could not be possible to 
validly invoke the exhaustion of the exclusive rights of the legitimate 
trademark owner in the absence of consent or unitary control.
58
 
F.  Analysis 
According to the ECJ‟s rulings, the primary purpose of trademark 
protection, as interpreted from Article 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty, is to 
indicate commercial origin.
59
  The “Affaire Hag” served as an example of how 
to understand the ECJ‟s progression in its appreciation of the fundamental 
objectives of intellectual property and how it found a compromise between 
the interest of intangible property protection and the dictates of the free 
movement of goods.  Accordingly, when goods have no common origin but 
instead have been manufactured and marketed independently, it is always 
possible to invoke trademark rights to prevent the importation of products 
bearing identical or similar trademarks that might create consumer confusion.  
Thus, for national laws to be limited by Article 28 there must typically be a 
consensual act by the exporting Member State to cause an exhaustion of rights 
in the importing Member State, and thus free parallel imports.
60
 
While affirming the legitimacy of parallel importation of genuine goods 
within the European internal market, the ECJ did not exclude the possibility 
for trademark owners to invoke exclusive rights where the products at issue 
 
54. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Tritton, supra note 29, at 423. 
55. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. at I-2789 to 792. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191; Case C-39/97, Canon 
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1999 R.P.C. 117. 
60. CORNISH, supra note 3, at 650. 
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were “materially different.”61  In this respect, repackaging and relabeling with 
different marks raised interesting issues.
62
  In many Member States, to sell or 
distribute trademarked goods that have been re-packed, re-marked, or 
otherwise interfered with was, and still is, considered trademark infringement 
because the marks no longer accurately indicate that the goods came unaltered 
from the originating enterprise.  After the adoption of the Trademark 
Directive, while acknowledging that the matter poses a peculiarly provocative 
constraint on the free movement of goods, the ECJ held that repackaging and 
relabeling are two of the “legitimate reasons” trademark owners may invoke 
to prevent parallel trade within the EEA.
63
  According to the ECJ, to trade 
non-genuine or repackaged products constitutes trademark infringement when 
it may lead to confusion on the part of the public or provoke unfair detriment 
to the trademark itself.
64
 
 
61. See Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R.1139, 1164-65.  Regarding the differences between 
“genuine” and “non-genuine goods,” see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:51.2, and the legal 
literature and case law cited. 
62. The ECJ did not make a clear distinction between the packaging and the product, since 
“product requirement” also incorporates rules as to the packaging of the product.  See Joined Cases 
C-267 & C-268/91, France v. Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, I-6131. With respect to 
pharmaceutical products, the ECJ confirmed its approach in Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, I-3536 to 3545, and most recently, in 
Case C-379/97, Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999 E.C.R. I-6927.  See generally Karen 
Dyekjaer Hansen & Christian Karhula Lauridsen, Rebranding of Parallel Imported Pharmaceuticals: 
The Pharmacia & Upjohn Case, TRADEMARK WORLD, Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000, at 16; David Rosemberg 
& Marleen Van Kerckhove, Upjon v. Paranova: Utterly Exhausted by a Trip too Far, 1999 E.I.P.R. 
223.  On the “relationship between the specific subject-matter of a trademark and the necessity of 
repackaging,” see also the April 23, 2002 decisions of the ECJ in Joined Case C-443/99, Merck, 
Sharp & Dohme GmbH v. Paranova Pharmazeutika Handels GmbH and Case C-143/00, Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharma KG v. Swingward Ltd., and others, available at 
http://curia.eu.int/en/jurisp/index.htm (last visited May 20, 2002). 
63. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 137-139; see generally Ansgar Ohly, Trade 
Marks and Parallel Importation – Recent Developments in European Law, 30 I.I.C. 512 (1999); Paul 
Torremans, New Repackaging Under the Trade Mark Directive of Well-Established Exhaustion 
Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997). 
64. For a case concerning these aspects, see Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. Ballantine & Son 
Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6227 and Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. 
I-6013. For comments, see generally Gert-Jan Van De Kamp, Protection of Trade Marks: The New 
Regime – Beyond Origin?, 1998 E.I.P.R. 364; Helen Norman, Perfume, Whisky and Leaping Cats of 
Prey: A U.K. Perspective on Three Recent Trade Mark Cases Before the European Court of Justice, 
1998 E.I.P.R. 306 (1998); Paul Walsh et al., Parallel Imports: Labelling and Advertising 
Trademarked Products, TRADEMARK WORLD, Feb. 1998, at 20. In Frits Loendersloot the Court 
affirmed that 
Article 36 of the EC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that the owner of trademark 
rights may, even if that constitutes a barrier to intra-Community trade, rely on those rights 
to prevent a third party from removing and then re-affixing or replacing labels bearing the 
mark which the owner has himself affixed to products he has put on the Community 
market, unless: . . . it is established that the use of the trademark rights by the owner to 
oppose the marketing of the relabeled products under that trademark would contribute to 
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III.  DEBATE ON ARTICLE 7(1) OF THE EUROPEAN TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE: IS 
COMMUNITY-WIDE EXHAUSTION A MINIMUM STANDARD OR THE GENERAL 
CRITERION IN THE  
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY? 
Article 7(1) of the European Trademark Directive has been a controversial 
provision ever since it was in the drafting process.  The text was substantially 
altered during the drafting process.
65
  The final text of the provision codifies 
the exhaustion doctrine as established by historical ECJ and confirms the 
principle of Community-wide exhaustion for all Member States (EEA-wide 
exhaustion since the EEA Agreement entered into force in 1994).
66
  Article 
7(1) states that “the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its 
use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community 
under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.”67  However, 
according to Article 7(2), this principle does not apply where “there exist 
legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of 
the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired 
after they have been put on the market.”68  The legitimate owner could not be 
expected to tolerate “further commercialization” of the branded products 
when it affects the essential function of the mark by taking unfair advantage 
or causing illegitimate detriment to the trademark‟s reputation.69 
While Article 7(1) is rather clear about exhaustion at the Community 
level, the provision is not clear about international exhaustion.
70
  After the 
introduction of the Trademark Directive, the question remains whether the 
principle of international exhaustion can be preserved in the trademark law of 
 
artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; . . . it is shown that the 
relabelling cannot affect the original condition of the product; . . . the presentation of the 
relabeled product is not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trademark and 
its owner; and . . . the person who relabels the products informs the trademark owner of the 
relabelling before the relabeled products are put on sale. 
Id. at ¶ 52. 
For critical comments on the dangers of extending trademark protection against infringements that do 
not contain elements of confusion, see Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 139-140. 
65. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 124. 
66. See supra note 10. 
67. Council Directive 89/104, art. 7(1), 1989 O.J. (L 040) 3. 
68. Id. at art. 7(2). 
69. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1996 E.C.R. at I-3457, Frits Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. at I-
6227, and Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. at I-6013, the Court introduced new elements into the 
doctrine of exhaustion, making room for the protection of reputation and goodwill as an exception to 
the exhaustion rule even where its essential function, i.e., indicator of origin, is not endangered.  See 
also Van De Kamp, supra note 64, at 369. 
70. Council Directive 89/104, art. 7(1), 1989 O.J. (L 040) 3. 
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the Member States that originally recognized this principle, such as Germany, 
Austria, England, and the Netherlands.
71
 
There is no doubt that the exhaustion provision of the Trademark 
Directive and the CTM Regulation in the Commission‟s original proposal was 
intended to apply to those imports from outside the Community as much as to 
those within.
72
  The original text of the 8
th
 recital of the Trademark Directive 
stated that “it is not, in principle, possible to prohibit its use by a third party in 
 
71. Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Mark Directive Allow International Exhaustion of 
Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995).  The German delegation, for example, argued that, even after 
the adoption of the Trademark Directive, the national principle of international exhaustion could be 
maintained and would not be affected by Article 7(1) of the Directive. This position was strongly 
supported by many German authors, in particular by Professor F. K. Beier, the director of the Max-
Planck Institute in Munich.  See Beier, supra note 8, at 156-160.  In Gefärbte Jeans, 1996 G.R.U.R. 
271 (December 14, 1995) (I ZR 210/93), the German Federal Court held, however, that international 
exhaustion no longer applied in German trademark law.  For a critical analysis of this case, see 
Florian Albert & Christopher Heath, Dyed But Not Exhausted – Parallel Imports and Trade Marks in 
Germany, 28 I.I.C. 24 (1997). The argument that Article 7(1) only represents a minimum standard 
was strongly supported also by the Swedish Government in its argument in Silhouette. 1998 
E.T.M.R. 539, ¶¶  21 and 28-29. Arguing that the Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 95 
(ex. Article 100A) of the EC Treaty, the Swedish Government argued, according to Advocate 
General Jacobs in his opinion, that “it is not part of the function of a trade mark to enable the owner 
to divide up the market and to exploit price differentials. The adoption of international exhaustion 
would bring substantial advantages to consumers, and would promote price competition.” Id. at 
opinion ¶ 48.  According to Article 95: 
4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, 
a Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds of major 
needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the environment or the 
working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the 
grounds for maintaining them. 
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by 
the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to 
introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of 
the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that 
Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the 
Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them. 
EC TREATY, art. 95. 
72. Cornish, supra note 22, at 174; COM(80)635 final/2 at 1. For further analysis on the 
preparatory works of the Trademark Directive and the CTM Regulation, see Cornish, supra note 22, 
at 173-74.  On the nature and extent of Article 7, Cornish asserted that the provision is characterized 
as “by nature of derogation . . . in its original context—free from movement within the market under 
Article 30 and 36—the provision has indeed only been necessary so far as national trade mark law 
would otherwise impose a barrier to that movement.”  Id. at 175.  The same has been asserted by 
Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Silhouette: 
Article 7(1) is a derogation from the rights conferred on the trade-mark owner by Article 
5(1).  In general derogations should not be construed broadly.  Here Article 7(1) cannot be 
construed more broadly than as providing for Community exhaustion.  It would be 
necessary to read into the Directive a further, implied derogation leaving open the 
possibility of provision for international exhaustion, which seems contrary to the structure 
of the Directive. 
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶ 34. 
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respect of goods marketed . . . within or outside the [European] Community 
under the trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent . . . .”73  Because of 
the “intense pressure from [the Community] and international industry, the 
draft . . . was changed . . . confining [it] to goods first marketed with consent 
„in the Community.‟”74  While the 8th recital was first amended to take into 
account that the Commission‟s decision to not require Member States to 
introduce the principle of international exhaustion into their national laws, the 
European Council (the “Council”) completely changed its previous text in the 
final version of the Trademark Directive.
75
  The reason given was that “an 
approach based solely on principles of trademark law would lead to 
undesirable commercial consequences.  In so far as third countries do not 
acknowledge the principle of international exhaustion, the Commission 
proposal would result in discrimination of the industry in the Community.”76 
Based on these considerations, it seemed difficult to contend that the 
Trademark Directive did not introduce the principle of Community-wide 
exhaustion for all Member States, while leaving room for conflicting or 
supplementary national rules.
77
  Arguing that the Trademark Directive 
expressly promotes only the partial harmonization of national law,
78
 those 
who favor international exhaustion noted that by restricting the ambit of 
Article 7 to EEA-wide exhaustion, the Council did not intend to harmonize 
international exhaustion, but rather intended to leave the Member States free 
to make or retain their own provisions.
79
  They contended that, prior to 
 
73. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 176 (quoting COM(80)635 final/2 at 1). 
74. Cornish, supra note 22, at 174. 
75. Id at 176. 
76. Document 1-611/83, 1 August 1983, at 63.  See also the Commentary to the amended 
proposal published by the Commission in 1985 (COM(85) final at 13) where it was affirmed that “in 
line with the proposal made by the Economic and Social Committee and Parliament, the Commission 
decided not to introduce international exhaustion.” 
77. In Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, the ECJ stated that Article 7 of the Directive must 
be “interpreted in the light of the rules of the [EC] Treaty [about] the free movement of goods, and in 
particular Article 36.”  Id. at ¶ 37.  It also emphasized that the “provision is intended to reconcile 
the . . . protection of [trademarks] with the . . . free movement of goods within the [internal] market.”  
Id. at ¶ 42. 
78. The 3
rd
 recital of the Trademark Directive states that “it does not appear to be necessary at 
present to undertake full-scale approximation of the trademark laws of the Member States and it will 
be sufficient if approximation is limited to those national provisions of law which most directly affect 
the functioning of the internal market.” Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40/1)  For a 
discussion concerning the extent of harmonization of the Trademark Directive, see also Advocate 
General Jacobs Opinion in Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, ¶¶ 4-7. 
79. Shea, supra note 71, at 463.  Among those who favor international exhaustion, see  
Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 176-78; Beier, supra note 8, at 156-60.  According to these authors, the 
intention of Article 7 was to codify the court‟s existing case law.  They argued that the ECJ had 
stressed that the provision should to be interpreted in the same way as the court‟s case law on Article 
28 and 30 of the EC Treaty.  However, in the leading case, Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin 
Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, the ECJ held that Articles 14(2) and 23 of the Free Agreement 
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implementation of the Trademark Directive, Member States had discretion 
whether “to adopt the principle of international exhaustion [and,] in absence 
of express [direction] to the contrary, [whether this] should remain the 
position under the [Trademark] Directive.”80  They also contended that on the 
signing of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tarriffs and 
Trade, the ECJ had confirmed its opinion
81
 that Member States retained 
competence, “in conjunction with the Community in matters of international 
intellectual property.”82  Accordingly, Member States could be considered 
“free to negotiate or maintain arrangements with other countries that allow 
mutual exhaustion of trade mark rights.”83  Similarly, Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement had left open the possibility that any of the signatory countries 
could unilaterally adopt international exhaustion.
84
 
The opponents of international exhaustion heavily refuted these 
arguments.  They relied on the text of the 3
rd
 recital of the Trademark 
Directive and asserted that even though the Trademark Directive was not 
about total harmonization, international exhaustion was one of the provisions 
that the Trademark Directive sought to harmonize because it “most directly 
affect[ed] the functioning of the internal market.”85  They argued that 
diverging national provisions on international exhaustion would necessarily 
result in a lack of harmonization in one of the most important aspects of 
trademark rights.
86
  Allowing international exhaustion at a national level 
would produce distortion in the smooth running of intra-EEA trade and would 
provide unwelcome barriers to the free movement of goods imported from 
 
of 1972 between the EEC and Portugal (not yet a Member State), which were literal reproductions of 
Article 30 of the EC Treaty, did not introduce the principle of exhaustion between Portugal and the 
Community. 
80. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, ¶ 37. 
81. Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267. 
82. Shea, supra note 71, at 464 n.15. (“Thus requiring each Member State individually to 
ratify the TRIPS Agreement.”). 
83. Id. at 464. 
84. See Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 508 (noting that Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides that “for the purposes of dispute settlement [under this Agreement, subject to the provisions 
of Articles 3 [“national treatment”] and 4 [“most favoured nation treatment”]] nothing in [this 
Agreement] shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights”).  This 
provision represents a compromise between two opposite approaches: “[t]he US Proposal [to 
introduce its own national system,] national exhaustion[,] and the [pleas of] developing countries . . . 
for the opposite,” international exhaustion.  Id. at 508.  Because of the lack of consensus on the issue, 
“[e]very country [remained] free to adopt the exhaustion [regime it] want[ed].”  Id.  On the drafting 
of Article 6 of TRIPS, see id. at 506-508.  For a critical analysis, see generally Soltysinsky, supra 
note 15, at 317-20. 
85. Shea, supra note 71, at 484.  See also Annette Kur, Harmonization of the Trademarks 
Laws in Europe – An Overview, 28 I.I.C. 16 (1997). 
86. Shea, supra note 71, at 484.  See generally Kur, supra note 85. 
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third countries within the EEA.
87
  Indeed, it would obviously contradict the 
spirit of the Trademark Directive and the trend established by the ECJ in its 
decisions concerning Articles 28 and 30 of the EC Treaty if international 
exhaustion were to only apply within the borders of States that recognize this 
principle.
88
  On the contrary, if products put into the market of the Member 
States that allow international exhaustion could freely circulate throughout the 
EEA, international exhaustion would be imposed in the whole Community, 
and non-exhaustion rules of other countries would be defeated.
89
 
The opponents of international exhaustion found an additional argument 
in support of their position in the interpretation of Article 13 of the CTM 
Regulation.
90
  Like Article 7 of the Trademark Directive, the final version of 
Article 13 of the CTM Regulation refers exclusively to the exhaustion of 
trademark rights in relation to goods marketed within the Community.
91
  
However, the CTM Regulation was different from the Trademark Directive 
because it did not intend to achieve partial harmonization.
92
  The CTM 
Regulation affected all Member States and denied any discretion to opt for 
alternative rules, including the international exhaustion regime.
93
 
Therefore, the question remained whether the provisions of the CTM 
Regulation and the Trademark Directive could be construed differently, even 
though they had a common origin and identical text.  The opponents of 
international exhaustion stressed that, in order to establish a consistent 
exhaustion regime applicable to all trademarks within the European market, 
the provision of Article 13 of the CTM Regulation supported the view that the 
Trademark Directive was intended to preclude international exhaustion.
94
  In 
contrast, the supporters of the principle of international exhaustion argued that 
the objectives of the two instruments were different because the Trademark 
Directive only aimed for limited harmonization.
95
 
 
87. Id.; Cornish, supra note 22, at 175. 
88. Cornish, supra note 22, at 175; see also Shea, supra note 71, at 464. 
89. Cornish, supra note 22, at 175; see also Shea, supra note 71, at 464. 
90. Council Regulation EC/40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, art. 
13, 1994 O.J. (L 011) [hereinafter CTM Regulation]. 
91. Article 13(1) of the CTM Regulation states that “[a] Community trade mark shall not 
entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the 
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.”Id. 
92. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶¶ 59-61. 
93. CTM Regulation, supra note 90 ¶ 61.  The purpose of the CTM Regulation is to create a 
unitary right enforceable throughout the whole Community.  Id. ¶ 56.  Accordingly, Article 14(1) of 
the CTM Regulation requires the effects of the right to be governed solely by its own provisions, 
stating that “the effects of Community trademarks shall be governed solely by the provisions of this 
Regulation.”  Id., art. 14.  See also Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶¶ 55-63. 
94. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶¶ 61-62. 
95. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464. 
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Despite the fact that supporters of international exhaustion are not 
unfounded in their arguments, the conclusion that Article 7(1) precludes 
Member States from adopting international exhaustion, so that any national 
provisions in this sense are contrary to European trademark law, seems 
difficult to avoid.
96
  The wording and the purpose of the Trademark Directive, 
its legislative history, the identical wording of the CTM Regulation, and the 
undesirable effects of leaving matters to the discretion of the Member States 
favor such a position.  On the other hand, differences in the interpretation of 
the issue at the national level represent a barrier to consistent enforcement 
practices throughout the Community.
97
  Several national courts have 
repeatedly tried to force an interpretation of the Trademark Directive towards 
the direct or indirect acceptance of international exhaustion.  So far, the 
adoption of the Trademark Directive does not appear to have profoundly 
changed the way many national courts evaluate the issue, which is necessary 
in order to ensure a consistent Community harmonization.
98
  It has been 
noticed that “there is still scope for national courts . . . to reach different views 
on the same issue when applying [Community] intellectual property law.”99 
IV.  VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-WIDE 
EXHAUSTION AS CONFIRMED IN SILHOUETTE AND SEBAGO 
In light of the previous discussion, it is not surprising that in the last few 
years, national tribunals have repeatedly referred to the decisions of the ECJ 
for guidance when interpreting Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.
100
  
Because divergences in domestic laws predate the Trademark Directive, it is 
not surprising that the question of compatibility of international trademark 
exhaustion with Community law is always raised in those countries that adopt 
international exhaustion.
101
 
The ECJ‟s rulings represent the most highly qualified guidelines on the 
interpretation of Community Law.  However, from a legal standpoint, they are 
not binding upon national courts.  As for now, domestic tribunals have shown 
a general willingness to follow the ECJ‟s decisions.  Because the ECJ‟s 
rulings do not technically represent the “law of Europe,” national decisions 
 
96. See Joller, supra note 1, at 309; George Pucher, Der zeitliche Anwendungsbereich der nur 
EWR-weiten Erschöpfung im Markenrecht, 4 W.R.P. 362 (1998). 
97. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464; Cornish, supra note 22, at 173-75. 
98. For a summary of the different practices and attitudes in the interpretation of the issue by 
national courts and legislators, see Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 502-506.  Very interesting in this 
respect is the study carried out by Abbe E. L. Brown, Post-Harmonisation Europe—United, Divided 
or Unimportant? 2001 INTELL. PROP. Q. 275. 
99. Brown, supra note 98, at 279. 
100. Id. 
101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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cannot be excluded in the future, even after the conclusions reached by the 
ECJ in the following cases. 
A.  Silhouette 
The need for interpretation of Article 7(1) was first expressed by the 
Austrian Supreme Court when it was confronted with the re-importation from 
Bulgaria to Austria of sunglasses and spectacle frames bearing the trademark 
“Silhouette.”102  The Austrian company, Silhouette International Schmied 
(Silhouette International), sold 21,000 out-of-fashion sunglasses and spectacle 
frames to a Bulgarian company at a discount price with the instruction to sell 
those products only in Bulgaria or the states of the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and not to export them to other countries.
103
  
“Nevertheless, the goods found their way back to Austria where the discount 
chain Hartlauer tried to sell them at . . . advantageous price[s].”104  Silhouette 
International argued that the products at issue had been put into the market in 
the EEA without its consent and therefore brought an action for interim relief 
against Hartlauer.
105
  Silhouette International claimed that its trademark right 
was not exhausted, since that would only occur when its products were put 
into the EEA market.
106
 
Prior to the implementation of the Trademark Directive, Austrian courts 
applied the principle of international exhaustion.
107
  However, the position 
subsequent to implementation was still unclear.
108
  The explanatory 
memorandum to the Austrian law that implemented Article 7 of the 
Trademark Directive indicated that the law was intended to leave the question 
of whether the principle of international exhaustion was valid to future 
judicial decisions.
109
  The Austrian Supreme Court decided to ask the ECJ 
whether national rules providing for exhaustion of trademark rights with 
respect to products put into the market outside the EEA by the trademark 
owner or with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the Trademark 
Directive.
110
  In other words, the question to resolve was whether the principle 
 
102. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶¶ 1-14. 
103. Id. ¶ 8. 
104. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 125. 
105. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 10. 
106. Id.  The judicial proceedings at the national level are summarized in the ECJ‟s decision.  
Id. ¶¶ 10-14. 
107. Id. ¶ 13. 
108. Id. 
109. Id.  See also Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 504. 
110. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 15. 
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of international exhaustion was still applicable under Austrian law after the 
implementation of the Trademark Directive.
111
 
The answer given by the ECJ followed the approach adopted by the 
Commission and the Council when they issued the Trademark Directive.
112
  
On July 16, 1998, the ECJ clarified that “national rules providing for 
exhaustion of trademark rights in respect of products put on the market 
outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with his consent are 
contrary to Article 7(1) of the Directive.”113  While confirming the principle 
of EEA-wide exhaustion, the Advocate General emphasized that 
“international exhaustion is one of the . . . [matters] which „most directly 
affect the functioning of the internal market‟ and . . . which the [Trademark] 
Directive . . . [seeks] to harmonize.”114  Accordingly, “if some Member States 
practice international exhaustion while others do not, there will be trade 
barriers within the internal market which it is precisely the object of the 
[Trademark] Directive to remove.”115  In particular, the Advocate General 
stressed that “the [Trademark] Directive cannot be interpreted as leaving it 
open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of 
the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of products put on the market 
 
111. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 125.  The questions asked by the Austrian 
Supreme Court were: 
(1) Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40, p.1) to 
be interpreted as meaning that the trademark entitles its proprietor to prohibit a third party 
from using the mark for goods which have been put on the market under that mark in a 
State which is not a Contracting State? 
(2) May the proprietor of the trademark on the basis of Article 7(1) of the Trade Marks 
Directive alone seek an order that the third party cease using the trademark for goods 
which have been put on the market under that mark in a State which is not a Contracting 
State? 
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 14. 
112. See id. ¶ 27.  For discussions of this case, see generally Alan W. White, Sunglasses: A 
Benefit to Health? 1999 E.I.P.R. 176; Jochen Pagenberg, The Exhaustion Principle and ―Silhouette‖ 
Case, 30 I.I.C. 19 (1999); Andrew Clark, Parallel Imports: A New Job for Customs?, 1999 E.I.P.R. 
1; Thomas Hays, The Silhouette Case: The European Union Moves to the Highest Common 
Denominator on the Gray Market Question, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 234 (1998); Thomas Hays & Peter 
Hansen, Silhouette is not the Proper Case Upon Which to Decide the Parallel Importation Question, 
1998 E.I.P.R. 277; Carl Steele, ―Fortress Europe‖ for Trademark Owners: The Spectacle of the ECJ 
Silhouette Judgment, TRADEMARK WORLD Aug. 1998, at 14. 
113. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 31.  In its ruling, the court affirmed: 
National rules providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in respect of products put on 
the market outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with its consent are 
contrary to Article 7(1) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of December 21, 1988 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks, as amended by the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area of May 2, 1992. 
Id. at Ruling ¶ 1. 
114. Id. at Opinion ¶ 41. 
115. Id. 
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in non-member countries.”116  The ECJ replied to the argument of the Swedish 
Government that the [Trademark] Directive was adopted on the basis of 
Article 100(a) of the Treaty “with the result that Article 7 is to be interpreted 
as meaning that the [Trademark] Directive applies only to intra-Community 
relations.”117  The ECJ stated that “Article 7 is not intended to regulate 
relations between Member States and non-member countries but to define the 
rights of proprietors of trademarks in the Community.”118  In the ECJ‟s view, 
“[t]his is the only interpretation which is fully capable of ensuring that the 
purpose of the [Trademark] Directive is achieved, namely to safeguard the 
functioning of the internal market.”119 
Considering the strong pressure from some Member States, the ECJ 
ultimately noted that “the Community authorities could always extend the 
exhaustion provided for by Article 7 to products put on the market in non-
member countries by entering into international agreements in that sphere, as 
was done in the context of the EEA Agreement.”120  However, as noted 
earlier, this approach could come under the scope of the WTO Agreement.
121
  
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement does not address exhaustion.
122
  Despite 
this, establishing bilateral or multilateral agreements with non-member 
countries for the purpose of trademark exhaustion may ultimately represent a 
violation of the principle of “Most Favored Nation” as per Article 4 of 
TRIPS.
123
 
B.  Silhouette & Mag Instrument 
In its judgment, the ECJ attempted to overrule a decision adopted by the 
EFTA Court of Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, on the same issue one 
 
116. Id. at Opinion ¶ 26. 
117. Id. ¶ 28.  For the full text of Article 95 (ex. Article 100A) of the EC Treaty, see supra 
note 71. 
118. Id. ¶ 29. 
119. Id. ¶ 27.  Following the ECJ decision, the Austrian Supreme Court decided the Silhouette 
case consistently with the ECJ, and declared that Silhouette Internationale‟s rights “were not 
exhausted by putting its spectacles bearing the trademark on the market in Bulgaria; by re-importing 
these spectacles into Austria, the defendant has infringed Sec. 10a(1) of the Trademark Act.” Id.  See 
also Case No. 4 Ob 223/98, Decision of the Austrian Supreme Court, 31 I.I.C. 207, 212 (2000). 
120. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. ¶ 30. 
121. See Verma, supra note 4, at 552-62; Heath, supra note 1, at 628-30; Soltysinsky, supra 
note 15, at 316. 
122. Verma, supra note 4, at 535. 
123. See Shea, supra note 71, at 464 n.16; Verma, supra note 4, at 552-62.  “A review of 
TRIPS started in 2000 and it was believed that one issue which may be considered was the question 
of parallel import[ation] and [trademark] exhaustion.”  Brown, supra note 98, at 285.  However, “[t]o 
date . . . there [are no new] developments in this regard.” Id. The issue was not stressed, as it was not 
even on the agenda, during the WTO Conference in Doha, Quatar, in November 2001.  For further 
details see the WTO web site at http://www.wto.org (last visited May 2, 2002). 
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year earlier in Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Company.
124
  Mag 
Instrument concerned the parallel importation of flashlights from the United 
States into Norway.
125
  The EFTA Court argued that “the principle of 
international exhaustion is in the interest of free trade and competition, and 
thus in the interest of consumers.”126  The court stated that it was for the 
courts or legislators in EFTA States to decide whether they wish to introduce 
or maintain the principle of international exhaustion of trademark rights for 
products imported from outside the EEA.
127
  In order to draw a distinction 
between the position of the EFTA countries and the Member States, the court 
stressed that, “unlike the EC Treaty, the EEA Agreement does not establish a 
customs union,”128 but merely a free trade area, and that the EEA Agreement 
does not entail a common commercial policy towards third countries.
129
 
This decision encountered severe criticism.  Even if there is no doubt that 
international exhaustion can play an important role in increasing competition, 
the approach suggested by the EFTA Court would result in reinstating those 
barriers against the free movement of goods within the EEA that the 
 
124. 29 I.I.C. 316 (EFTA 1998). 
125. Id. 
126. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 505. 
127. Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶ 30. 
128. Id. at Opinion ¶ 43. 
129. See id; see also Mag Instrument, 29 I.I.C. at 316.  According to the EFTA Court, the 
principle of Community-wide exhaustion only applies to products “originating in the EEA . . . .”  Id. 
at ¶ 43.  Indeed, 
[t]he purpose and the scope of the EC Treaty and the EEA Agreement are different (see 
Opinion 1/91 of the ECJ regarding the Draft Agreement between the Community, on the 
one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating 
to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079). Thus, the EEA 
Agreement does not establish a customs union, but a free trade area. The above mentioned 
differences between the Community and the EEA will have to be reflected in the 
application of the principle of exhaustion of trademark rights. According to Article 8 EEA, 
the principle of free movement of goods as laid down in Articles 11 to 13 EEA applies only 
to goods originating in the EEA, while in the Community a product is in free circulation 
once it has been lawfully placed on the market in a Member State. In general, the latter 
applies in the context of the EEA only in respect of products originating in the EEA. In the 
case at hand, the product was manufactured in the United States and imported into Norway. 
Accordingly, it is not subject to the principle of the free movement of goods within the 
EEA. 
Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. at Opinion ¶ 43 (quoting Mag Instrument, 29 I.I.C. ¶¶ 25-26).  For an 
interesting comparison of the two decisions, Silhouette and Mag Instruments, see Anna Carboni, 
Cases About Spectacles and Torches: Now, Can We See the Light? 1998 E.I.P.R. 470; Joller, supra 
note 1, at 751-65; Kunz-Hallstein, Zur Frage der Parallelimporte im Internationalen Gewerblichen 
Rechtsschutz, 1998 G.R.U.R. 268; Troller, The Parallel Importation of Trade-Marked Goods and the 
Protection of Selective Distribution Systems, 1998 E.I.P.R. 67.  Always interesting in this respect is 
Vanderburg, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is not a Trademark Problem, 
1959 TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959). 
2002] TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION 69 
Trademark Directive attempts to eliminate by harmonizing national laws.
130
  
Within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EC Treaty, the exclusive rights of 
trademark owners are equally exhausted if products are put into the market in 
Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, or in any Member State of the 
Community.  Consistency between the ECJ and the EFTA Court is necessary 
in order to avoid conflicting interpretations.
131
  
C.  Sebago 
One year after Silhouette, the ECJ confirmed the principle of EEA-wide 
exhaustion in Sebago.
132
  Sebago, a United States corporation, and Maison 
Dubois, Sebago‟s exclusive distributor in the Benelux, contended that another 
company‟s importation into Belgium of shoes marketed in El Salvador, 
bearing Sebago‟s trademark “Docksides,” without their consent, constituted 
trademark infringement under Benelux Trademark Law.
133
  The trademark 
owners argued that their rights had not been exhausted under Article 13A(8) 
of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law, which had implemented Article 7 of 
the Trademark Directive, because the products in question were put into the 
market outside the EEA and were brought into Belgium without their 
consent.
134
  In response, GB-Unic, the company that imported the shoes, 
argued that “to satisfy the consent requirement in Article 13A(8) of 
the . . . [Benelux Trademark Law, it was sufficient] that similar goods bearing 
the same trade mark had already been lawfully marketed in the Community 
with the consent of the trade mark proprietor.”135  In turn, Sebago claimed that 
“consent must be obtained for each defined batch of goods.”136  GB-Unic also 
argued that Sebago had given implied consent to the importation of the 
Docksides shoes into the EEA by failing to impose an export ban on its 
licensee in El Salvador.
137
  Accordingly, this failure should be interpreted as 
implied consent to importation of the products at issue into the EEA.
138
 
The Brussels Court of Appeal dismissed the latter argument because GB-
Unic could not prove that Sebago had effectively granted a license to use the 
 
130. See Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 505-506. 
131. See id.  Contrary to what is stated by the EFTA Court, it was also not so clear whether 
the EEA countries could withdraw so easily from the EC intellectual property rules. 
132. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 22. 
133. Id. ¶¶ 5-8. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. ¶ 10. 
136. Id. 
137. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 11. 
138. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 126 (summarizing the ECJ‟s decision); see 
also Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶¶ 1-11 (stating the opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs). 
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trademark in El Salvador.
139
  As this Study will analyze, the same argument 
was subsequently raised in the High Court cases Zino Davidoff and Levi 
Strauss
140
 in England.  Instead, the Brussels Court of Appeal deferred to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the general extent of Article 7(1) of the 
Trademark Directive.
141
  More specifically, the Belgian Court asked whether 
consent could be considered implied within the meaning of Article 7(1) when 
the trademark owner had consented to the marketing of other individual 
batches of the products in the EEA.
142
 
In its July 1, 1999 decision, the ECJ restated its previous ruling in 
Silhouette and affirmed that “the rights conferred by the trademark are 
exhausted only if the products have been put on the market in [the EEA].”143  
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive “does not leave it open to the Member 
States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of the rights conferred 
by the trademark in respect of products put on the market in non-member 
countries.”144  The ECJ then stated that: 
 
139. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 30. 
140. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99). 
141. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 10. 
142. Id. ¶ 12.  The Brussels Court of Appeal referred to the ECJ the following questions: 
Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks . . . to be interpreted as 
meaning that the right conferred by the trademark entitles its proprietor to oppose the use 
of his trademark in relation to genuine goods which have not been put on the market in the 
European Economic Community (extended to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein by virtue 
of the Agreement of 2 May 1992 establishing the European Economic Area) by the 
proprietor or with his consent, where: 
- the goods bearing the trademark come directly from a country outside the Community or 
the European Economic Area, 
- the goods bearing the trademark come from a Member State of the Community or of the 
European Economic Area in which they are in transit without the consent of the proprietor 
of the trademark or his representative, 
- if the goods were acquired in a Member State of the European Community or of the 
European Economic Area in which they were put on sale for the first time without the 
consent of the proprietor of the trademark or his representative, 
- either where goods bearing the trademark - which are identical to the genuine goods 
bearing the same trademark but are imported in parallel either directly or indirectly from 
countries outside the European Community or the European Economic Area - are, or have 
already been, marketed within the Community or the European Economic Area by the 
proprietor of the trademark or with his consent, 
- or where goods bearing the trademark - which are similar to the genuine goods bearing 
the same trademark but imported in parallel either directly or indirectly from countries 
outside the European Community or the European Economic Area - are, or have already 
been, marketed within the Community or the European Economic Area by the proprietor of 
the trademark or with his consent. 
Id. ¶ 10. 
143. Id. ¶ 22.  The same statement is reaffirmed in the ECJ‟s conclusions. 
144. Id. 
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protection would be devoid of substance if, for there to be exhaustion 
within the meaning of Article 7, it were sufficient for the trade-mark 
proprietor to have consented to the putting on the market in that 
territory of goods which were identical or similar to those in respect of 
which exhaustion is claimed.
145
 
Accordingly, the ECJ thought the answer to the second question addressed 
by the Brussels Court of Appeal should be that “for there to be consent within 
the meaning of Article 7(1) of the [D]irective, such consent must relate to 
each individual item of the product in respect of which exhaustion is 
pleaded.”146  In support of its ruling, the ECJ stated that its “interpretation is, 
moreover, confirmed by Article 7(2) of the [Trademark] Directive which, in 
its reference to the „further commercialization‟ of goods, shows that the 
principle of exhaustion concerns only specific goods which have first been put 
on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor.”147 
The arguments proposed by the defendant GB-Unic in Sebago
148
 looked 
innovative and interesting from a legal standpoint.  However, they 
misinterpreted the exhaustion doctrine‟s rationale of preventing abuses of 
trademark rights by limiting the control of the proprietor of the trademark to 
the first sale of the products bearing his trademark.
149
  The principle of 
exhaustion, whether EEA-wide or international, should apply to each 
individual product and not to types of goods or product lines.  As noted by 
Advocate General Jacobs in Sebago, if a limitation of trademark rights 
through the adoption of the principle of international exhaustion in the EEA 
“seem[s] desirable and would no doubt be welcomed in many circles,”150 it 
should be decided as a matter of Community law.
151
  As the Advocate General 
stressed: 
 
145. Id. ¶ 21. 
146. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R.. ¶ 22. The ECJ also affirmed that this is the interpretation of Article 
7(1) that the Court has already adopted.  Thus, the Court has already held that the purpose of that 
provision is to make possible the further marketing of an individual item of a product bearing a 
trademark that has been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor and to 
prevent him from opposing such marketing (Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] 
ECR I-6013, paragraphs 37 and 38, and Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 
57).  That interpretation is, moreover, confirmed by Article 7(2) of the Directive which, in its 
reference to the „further commercialisation‟ of goods, shows that the principle of exhaustion 
concerns only specific goods which have first been put on the market with the consent of the trade-
mark proprietor.  Id. ¶ 20. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
150. Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. ¶ 29. 
151. Id.  The Advocate General pointed out that “[h]owever, as the Court observed in 
Silhouette, no argument has been presented to the Court that the Directive could be interpreted as 
imposing a rule of international exhaustion.  The dispute centered only on whether the Directive left 
the matter to the discretion of the Member States.”  Id. 
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[t]he [C]ourt cannot . . . be expected to stand legislation on its head in 
order to achieve an objective, even were it to be considered desirable.  
If the [Trademark] Directive is found to have effects which are 
unacceptable, the correct remedy is to amend the [Trademark] 
Directive or, as the court observed in . . . Silhouette, to enter into 
international agreements in order to extend the principle of exhaustion 
to products put on the market in non-member countries, as was done 
in the EEA Agreement.
152
 
Once again, the latter approach may be construed as a violation of Article 
4 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Accordingly, a general consensus for the 
amendment of the Trademark Directive could represent a more adequate 
solution to the issue. 
V. ZINO DAVIDOFF AND LEVI STRAUSS:  
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION VIA THE BACK DOOR? 
In 1999, the High Court of Justice in London reexamined whether or not 
consent could be implied under certain conditions, as per Article 7(1) of the 
Trademark Directive, in three cases that concerned the parallel importation of 
genuine products from outside the EEA: Zino Davidoff v. A & G Imports,
153
 
Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores,
154
 and Levi Strauss v. Costco Wholesale.
155
  
These cases did not follow the position adopted by the ECJ in Silhouette and 
Sebago, once again showing the reluctance of some Member States to accept 
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion in their domestic law. 
Nevertheless, these cases introduced very interesting elements into the debate 
on the exhaustion of trademark rights.  They emphasized the question of the 
role of national contract law, and because international contracts were 
involved, the role of national rules on private international law in relation to 
 
152. Id. ¶ 30.  See generally Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501. The author stresses how, 
during the drafting proceeding of the Trademark Directive, the Commission pointed out that, even if 
it had decided to introduce the principle of Community-wide exhaustion, 
the Community must, however, be empowered to conclude, at some future time, with 
important trading partners, bilateral or multilateral agreements, whereby international 
exhaustion is introduced by the contracting parties.  The restriction to Community-wide 
exhaustion, however, does not prevent the national courts from extending this principle, in 
cases of a special nature, in particular where, even in the absence of a formal agreement, 
reciprocity is guaranteed. 
Commission Explanatory Memorandum, COM(84)470 final. 
153. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 567.  For comments on this case see, Stamatoudi & 
Torremans, supra note 22, at 129; Anna Carboni, Zino Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports Limited: A 
Way Around Silhouette?, 1999 E.I.P.R. 524; Carl Steele, Silhouette Put in the Shade: A Summary of 
the Recent Davidoff Case, 119 TRADEMARK WORLD 25 (1999); Robert Swift, Davidoff: Scottish 
Court Declines to Follow English Rule on Parallel Imports, 2000 E.I.P.R. 376. 
154. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99). 
155. Id. 
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choice of law in contractual matters.
156
  These cases were referred to the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling.  Following its previous position, the ECJ reaffirmed 
the regime of Community-wide exhaustion as the applicable rule within the 
EEA, and consistently analyzed the issue of “consent” as per Article 7(1) of 
the Trademark Directive.
157
 
A.  Zino Davidoff v. Imports Limited 
Zino Davidoff came before Mr. Justice Laddie in the High Court of 
London as an application for summary judgment.
158
  Davidoff SA, the owner 
of the trademarks “Cool Water” and “Davidoff Cool Water,” tried to prevent 
the importation of a batch of Davidoff toiletries to the EEA by A&G Imports 
(A&G).
159
  The batch in question had been marketed in Singapore with 
Davidoff‟s consent.160  Even though it was clear that the products were not 
marketed within the Community with the explicit consent of the trademark 
owner, it was unclear whether Davidoff‟s consent to the marketing of its 
products in Singapore implicitly extended to their free circulation and sale 
around the world.
161
  “Davidoff den[ied] that it had consented, or could be 
treated as having consented” to further commercialization of the products in 
question.
162
  In turn, A&G argued that there was consent and that the exact 
content and implications of the consent were to be derived from the contract 
for the sale of the goods.
163
  Mr. Justice Laddie felt that, pursuant to the 
relevant law of contract in this case, it was arguable that subsequent 
purchasers of Davidoff‟s products were free to market the goods within the 
EEA and that the plaintiffs were to be treated as having consented to such 
marketing.
164
  It was suggested that English law included a rebuttable 
presumption that, in the absence of the imposition of a full and explicit 
restriction on purchasers at the time of purchase, trademark owners are to be 
treated as having consented to the importation and the sale of the goods in the 
EEA.
165
  In this case, full and explicit restriction had not been imposed.  
 
156. Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 129. 
157. Id. at 130. 
158. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at 568. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
161. Id. ¶ 5. 
162. Id. ¶ 20. 
163. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. at ¶ 21. 
164. Id. ¶ 23. 
165. Id. ¶ 28. 
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Accordingly, on May 18, 1999, the High Court declined to grant summary 
judgment because it did not consider the defendant‟s arguments unfounded.166 
Because the case raised fundamental questions relating to the scope and 
effect of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive, a reply to which would be 
necessary for the determination of the issue at the full trial, the High Court of 
London deferred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
167
  The High Court asked 
whether the concept of consent, as per Article 7(1), could extend to implicit or 
indirect consent and not only to explicit and direct consent.
168
  It also asked 
whether a national law, which constitutes a general presumption that 
trademark owners have waived their exclusive rights in the absence of a full 
and explicit restriction, could be considered consistent within the Trademark 
Directive‟s meaning.169 
 
166. Id. ¶ 37 (arguing that “neither Silhouette nor Sebago throw any light on the issue of how 
the proprietor can object effectively to such trade”).  Justice Laddie further declared: 
the rights of the third party can be determined by the law of the contract of supply to that 
customer or the law of the non EEA country in which the sale to the third party takes place.  
Where that law includes a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of full or explicit 
restrictions being imposed on purchasers at the time of purchase, the proprietor is treated as 
consenting to the goods being imported into and sold in the EEA, courts within the EEA 
are free to recognize the effect of that law and to allow importation of the authorized 
external goods accordingly. 
Id. ¶ 39.  For further details, see Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99).  In 
this context it should also be noticed that a very similar case was submitted to the Outer House of the 
Court of Session in Scotland (JOOP! GmbH v. M&S Toiletries Ltd and Zino Davidoff SA v. M&S 
Toiletries Ltd., reported by Brown, supra note 98, at 279).  While the parallel importers argued that, 
because of insufficient marketing restrictions, there was implied consent to re-importation into the 
EEA, the Scottish court found that the trademark owner had taken all reasonable measures to ensure 
goods would be sold in particular territories.  Accordingly, no implied consent could be inferred. Id. 
167. Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. ¶ 43. 
168. Id. at ¶¶ 16-25. 
169. Id.  The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patent Court), 
requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the following questions: 
(1) Insofar as First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the 
laws of the Member States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1) refers to goods 
being put on the market in the Community with the consent of the proprietor of a mark, is it 
to be interpreted as including consent given expressly or implicitly and directly or 
indirectly? 
(2) Where: (a) a proprietor has consented to or allowed goods to be placed in the hands of a 
third party in circumstances where the latter‟s rights to further market the goods are 
determined by the law of the contract of purchase under which that party acquired the 
goods, and (b) the said law allows the vendor to impose restrictions on the further 
marketing or use of the goods by the purchaser but also provides that, absent the imposition 
by or on behalf of the proprietor of effective restrictions on the purchaser‟s right to further 
market the goods, the third party acquires a right to market the goods in any country, 
including the Community, then, if restrictions effective according to that law to limit the 
third party‟s rights to market the goods have not been imposed, is the Directive to be 
interpreted so as to treat the proprietor as having consented to the right of the third party 
acquired thereby to market the goods in the Community? 
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B.  Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores and Levi Strauss v. Costco Wholesale 
The issue of how to interpret “consent” was raised again before Mr. 
Justice Pumfrey in the High Court of London in Levi Strauss v. Tesco Stores 
and Costco Wholesale.
170
  Levi Strauss commenced proceedings against Tesco 
Stores and Costco Wholesale, claiming trademark infringement of its “Levi‟s” 
mark.
171
  Levi Strauss had refused, directly or through its subsidiary in 
England, to sell Levi‟s 501 jeans to Tesco and Costco.172  It had also refused 
to allow these companies to operate as authorized distributors of the products 
in question.
173
  Tesco and Costco accordingly obtained genuine top-quality 
Levi‟s 501 jeans from traders who had imported such jeans from countries 
outside the EEA.
174
  The jeans sold by Tesco had been manufactured by, or on 
behalf of Levi Strauss in the United States, Canada, or Mexico and were first 
sold in those respective countries.
175
  The jeans sold by Costco had also been 
manufactured in the United States or Mexico.
176
  The contracts pursuant to 
which Tesco and Costco purchased these jeans contained no restrictions as to 
the markets in which the goods could be sold.
177
 
 
(3) If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is it for the national courts to 
determine whether, in all the circumstances, effective restrictions were imposed on the 
third party? 
(4) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons 
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include any actions by a 
third party which affect to a substantial extent the value, allure or image of the trademark 
or the goods to which it is applied? 
(5) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons 
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include the removal or 
obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of any markings on the goods where such 
removal or obliteration is not likely to cause any serious or substantial damage to the 
reputation of the trademark or the goods bearing the mark? 
(6) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons 
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include the removal or 
obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of batch code numbers on the goods where 
such removal or obliteration results in the goods in question (i) offending against any part 
of the criminal code of a Member State (other than a part concerned with trademarks) or 
(ii) offending against the provisions of Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (OJ 1976 
L 262, p. 169)? 
Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 16. 
170. Id. at Opinion ¶¶ 1-2. 
171. Id. ¶ 24. 
172. Id. ¶ 21. 
173. Id. 
174. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 22. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
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Levi Strauss emphasized its selling policy for the above countries.  In the 
United States and Canada, Levi Strauss sells its products to authorized 
retailers, who are obliged, under pain of having their supplies cut off, to sell 
the jeans exclusively to end users.
178
  In Mexico, Levi Strauss usually sells its 
goods to authorized wholesalers under the condition that they will not be 
exported from Mexico.
179
  In response, Tesco and Costco argued that they had 
acquired an unrestricted right to dispose of the jeans as they wish, because no 
express restriction was expressly imposed by contract.
180
 
It was against this background that in July, 1999, a few months after 
Justice Laddie‟s decision in Zino Davidoff, the High Court decided to defer to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  The questions asked by the High Court were 
very similar to the ones asked previously in Zino Davidoff.
181
  The High Court 
focused on the need to clarify the concept of consent, and in particular the 
concept of implied consent, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Trademark 
Directive.  The High Court also addressed the compatibility of Community 
law with the national provision, according to which, trademark owners should 
be considered as having waived their exclusive right worldwide in the absence 
of any express reservation in the contract governing the sale of the goods.
182
  
In addition, the High Court raised the question of whether a restriction of the 
right to dispose freely of goods may be relied upon against a third party 
transferee when it is imposed on the first purchaser by the first vendor, or 
agreed between the two parties to the sale.
183
 
 
178. Id. at ¶ 25. 
179. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 25. 
180. Id. ¶ 27. 
181. Id. ¶ 28. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Chancery Division (Patent Court), 
referred the following questions to the Court of Justice: 
(1) Where goods bearing a registered trademark have been placed on the market in a non-
EEA country by the trademark proprietor or with his consent and those goods have been 
imported into or sold in the EEA by a third party, is the effect of Directive 89/104/EEC 
(the Directive) that the trademark proprietor is entitled to prohibit such importation or sale 
unless he has expressly and explicitly consented to it, or may such consent be implied? 
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is that consent may be implied, is consent to be implied 
from the fact that the goods have been sold by the proprietor or on his behalf without 
contractual restrictions prohibiting resale within the EEA binding the first and all 
subsequent purchasers? 
(3) Where goods bearing a registered trademark have been placed on the market in a non-
EEA country by the trademark proprietor: 
(a) to what extent is it relevant to or determinative of the issue whether or not there was 
consent by the proprietor to the placing of those goods on the market within the EEA, 
within the meaning of the Directive, that: (i) the person placing the goods on the market 
(not being an authorized retailer) does so with the knowledge that he is the lawful owner of 
the goods and the goods bear no indication that they may not be placed on the market in the 
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C.  The ECJ’s Decision 
On November 20, 2001, the ECJ issued its decision.
184
  Clearly aware that 
the questions addressed by the High Court of London were characterized by 
its criticisms of the exclusion of international exhaustion of trademark rights 
pursuant to the Trademark Directive,
185
 the ECJ again confirmed the principle 
of EEA-wide exhaustion as the general rule to be applied within the EEA.
186
  
The ECJ focused its attention on the interpretation of “consent,” and pointed 
out that consent, as per Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive, constitutes 
the decisive factor to be considered when assessing the extinction of a 
trademark owner‟s right to prevent third parties from importing goods bearing 
his trademark into the EEA.
187
  The interpretation of “consent” is a matter of 
Community law and should be consistent throughout the EEA.
188
  Should the 
meaning of “consent” be a matter for national laws, divergences in the 
threshold of trademark protection may develop and eventually undermine the 
 
EEA; and/or (ii) the person placing the goods on the market (not being an authorized 
retailer) does so with knowledge that the trademark proprietor objects to those goods being 
placed on the market within the EEA; and/or (iii) the person placing the goods on the 
market (not being an authorized retailer) does so with the knowledge that the trademark 
proprietor objects to them being placed on the market by anyone other than an authorized 
retailer; and/or (iv) the goods have been purchased from authorized retailers in a non-EEA 
country who have been informed by the proprietor that the proprietor objects to the sale of 
the goods by them for the purposes of resale, but who have not imposed upon purchasers 
from them any contractual restrictions on the manner in which the goods may be disposed 
of; and/or (v) the goods have been purchased from authorized wholesalers in a non-EEA 
country who have been informed by the proprietor that the goods were to be sold to 
retailers in that non-EEA country and were not to be sold for export, but who have not 
imposed upon purchasers from them any contractual restrictions on the manner in which 
the goods may be disposed of; and/or (vi) there has or has not been communication by the 
proprietor to all subsequent purchasers of its goods (i.e., those between the first purchaser 
from the proprietor and the person placing the goods on the market in the EEA) of its 
objection to the sale of the goods for the purposes of resale; and/or (vii) a contractual 
restriction has or has not been imposed by the proprietor and made legally binding upon the 
first purchaser prohibiting sale for the purposes of resale to anyone other than the ultimate 
consumer? 
(b) Does the issue of whether or not there was consent by the proprietor to the placing of 
those goods on the market within the EEA, within the meaning of the Directive, depend on 
some further or other factor or factors and, if so, which? 
Id. ¶ 28. 
184. See generally Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99). 
185. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 506-07. 
186. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶¶ 30-34. 
187. Id. ¶ 41 (stating that “[i]t therefore appears that consent, which is tantamount to the 
proprietor‟s renunciation of his exclusive right under Article 5 of the Directive to prevent all third 
parties from importing goods bearing his trademark, constitutes the decisive factor in the extinction 
of that right”). 
188. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. 
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purpose of the Trademark Directive‟s harmonization.189  In the absence of a 
legislative definition, the ECJ opted to supply a uniform interpretation.
190
 
As a general rule, the ECJ stated that “[i]n view of its serious effect in 
extinguishing the exclusive rights [of trademark owners] . . . consent must be 
so expressed that an intention to renounce those rights is unequivocally 
demonstrated . . . .”191  “Such intention will normally be gathered from an 
express statement of consent.”192  Nevertheless, the ECJ admitted that: 
consent may, in some cases, be inferred from facts and circumstances 
prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods 
on the market outside the EEA which, in the view of the national 
court, unequivocally demonstrate[s] that the proprietor has renounced 
his rights [to oppose placing of the goods on the market within the 
EEA].
193
 
However, contrary to the London High Court‟s opinion, the ECJ 
concluded that consent cannot be inferred 
from the fact that the proprietor of the trademark has not 
communicated to all subsequent purchasers of the goods placed on the 
market outside the EEA his opposition to marketing within the EEA; 
from the fact that the goods carry no warning of a prohibition of their 
being placed on the market within the EEA; from the fact that the 
trademark proprietor has transferred the ownership of the products 
bearing the trademark without imposing any contractual reservations 
and that, according to the law governing the contract, the property 
right transferred includes, in the absence of such reservations, an 
unlimited right of resale or, at the very least, a right to market the 
goods subsequently within the EEA.
194
 
Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive should accordingly be interpreted 
as precluding national rules, such as the English law at issue in these cases 
that constitute a general presumption of waiver or are equivalent to such a 
presumption.  Indeed, a “rule of national law, which is merely based upon the 
silence of the trademark proprietor, does not recogn[ize] implied consent, but 
 
189. Id.  See also Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 133; Cornish, supra note 22, at 
174-5. 
190. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 43. 
191. Id. ¶ 45. 
192. Id. ¶ 46. 
193. Id. ¶ 47. 
194. Id. ¶ 60. Accordingly, the ECJ did not accept the argument stressed by Justice Laddie: 
“There is nothing to support the suggestion that existing case law or Community law creates a 
presumption that a proprietor shall be taken to object to unfettered distribution of goods which have 
been sold on the open market outside the EEA unless he expressly consents to such further 
distribution.” Zino Davidoff, 30 I.I.C. 567, ¶ 37.  See also Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 
133. 
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rather deems consent to have the effect of limiting the protection afforded to 
trademark owners.”195 
The ECJ expanded its ruling while replying to the last question addressed 
by the High Court of London in the Levi Strauss cases.  In order to prevent 
further attempts to introduce international exhaustion via the back door, the 
ECJ adopted an approach clearly in favor of trademark owners.  The ECJ 
concluded that 
[s]ince . . . consent cannot be inferred from the proprietor‟s silence, 
preservation of his exclusive right cannot depend on there being an 
express prohibition of marketing within the EEA, which the proprietor 
is not obliged to impose, nor, a fortiori, on a repetition of that 
prohibition in one or more of the contracts concluded in the 
distribution chain.
196
 
Accordingly, “national rules on the enforceability of sales restrictions 
against third parties are not, therefore, relevant to the resolution of a dispute 
between the proprietor of a trade mark and a subsequent trader in the 
distribution chain concerning the preservation or extinction of the rights 
conferred by the trade mark.”197  In particular, the ECJ stressed that “it is not 
relevant [whether] the importer of goods bearing the trade mark is aware that 
the proprietor objects to their being placed on the market in the EEA or sold 
there by traders other than authorized retailers.”198  It is equally irrelevant if 
authorized “retailers and wholesalers have not imposed on their own 
purchasers contractual reservations setting out such opposition, even though 
they have been informed of it by the trade mark proprietors.”199 
The ECJ did not restate the possibility of adopting a less protective 
approach on the issue of consent in the future through the establishment of 
bilateral or multi-lateral agreements with non-member countries, as it had 
 
195. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶¶ 58-59.  In this 
respect, Advocate General Stix-Hackl has affirmed in her Opinion (available on the ECJ‟s web site 
http://curia.eu.int) that “it is for the national court . . . to determine whether, when the products 
concerned were in fact first placed on the market, the trademark proprietor had waived his exclusive 
right to control distribution within the EEA.” Id. ¶ 99.  On the other hand, such determination should 
happen “in compliance with the [provisions] of Community law and having regard to all the 
circumstances of the individual case.” Id. ¶ 123. 
196. Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99), ¶ 64. 
197. Id. ¶ 65. 
198. Id. ¶ 66. 
199. Id.  This approach is in contrast with the position adopted by the ECJ, on the same issue, 
in Case C-306/96, Javico International and Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 
E.C.R. I-1983.  For criticism of these aspects, see Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 139-
41; Cornish, supra note 22, at 176.  As noted before, this article does not elaborate on the antitrust 
issue.  However, it should be pointed out that the position adopted by the ECJ in its decision can be 
in contrast with principles of Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.  See supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
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previously done in Silhouette and Sebago.
200
  As noticed by the Commission 
itself, such silence probably derives from the increasing awareness that these 
agreements can be held illegal under the WTO system.
201
  As a result, this 
decision will receive severe criticism because it represents a victory for 
trademark owners, not for consumers or the market.  Because some Member 
States and national courts are reluctant to accept the current exhaustion 
regime, there is also little doubt that the debate will be reignited by some 
domestic tribunal in the near future.
202
 
VI.  POLITICAL DEBATE AND RECENT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE 
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
After the adoption of the Trademark Directive, European institutions and 
trade organizations have also debated the proper interpretation of Article 7(1).  
Similar to divergences encountered within national courts, Member States and 
interested circles were sharply divided.  This became apparent during the 
discussion in hearings and meetings among European institutions.  Once 
again, the supporters of international exhaustion claimed that the Community 
exhaustion regime constitutes an important barrier to parallel trade and creates 
high prices for consumer goods within the Union.  Those advocating 
Community exhaustion argued that this system is necessary for the promotion 
of European investments in innovation and high-quality goods.
203
 
In 1999, the Commission launched a study on the possible economic 
consequences of a change in the EEA-wide exhaustion regime.
204
  This study, 
which was carried out by National Economic Research Associates (NERA) in 
London and presented to the Commission in February 1999,
205
 confirmed that 
“[t]he main argument for maintaining the current exhaustion regime . . . is to 
 
200. See generally Zino Davidoff SA and Levi Strauss (Joined Cases C-414-416/99); 
Stamatoudi & Torremans, supra note 22, at 129-33. 
201. See Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 8. 
202. See generally Brown, supra note 98 (providing an updated overview of European 
domestic cases on parallel imports). 
203. The arguments stressed during the discussions within European institutions are well 
summarized on the Commission‟s web site at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/01-157.htm (last visited May 20, 2002). 
204. Rhys et al., The Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the Area of Trademarks, European 
Commission (1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/tmstudy.htm. 
205. Id.  This study emphasized the impact that a change in the existing regime could have in 
different market sectors.  For this purpose, it did not focus only on price differentials, “but also on 
product quality, product availability, after-sale services (guarantees), employment, distribution 
agreements [and] market segmentation.” Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, 
supra note 15, at 15.  As a result, the study emphasized that the impact of a change in the “exhaustion 
regime would be minimal in certain sectors like alcoholic drinks and confectionery, whereas it may 
have more significant consequences in others such as consumer electronics, domestic appliances and 
footwear.” Id. 
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protect [Community] competitiveness and innovation.”206  In particular, a 
change to international exhaustion would reduce the value of intellectual 
property and put European companies at a disadvantage against companies in 
countries that do not apply the same regime.  Furthermore, such a change 
would not necessarily lead to a tangible change in the market because 
trademark owners could still control the distribution of their goods by setting 
up selective distribution networks and prohibiting sales to unauthorized 
dealers.  This study also listed a series of arguments favoring a change to 
international exhaustion.
207
  “Besides reducing prices . . . [p]arallel 
importation would increase inter-brand competition, by reducing the 
possibility for a trade mark holder to exploit his position in that [specific] 
brand and to set higher prices in certain markets, and by increasing 
competition in the distribution of the product.”208  However, the study‟s 
overall conclusion was still in favor of the EEA-wide exhaustion regime.
209
 
The results of the NERA study were discussed by Member States and 
interested parties in April 1999 during two meetings organized by the 
Commission.
210
  As expected, the Member States appeared still divided on the 
issue.  Some delegations expressed strong support for the Community 
exhaustion regime, whereas others strongly advocated a change to 
international exhaustion.
211
  In particular, “certain delegations expressed 
doubts about the conclusions of the [NERA] study and its presumed negative 
effects of international exhaustion.”212  It was mentioned “that the positive 
long-term effects of international exhaustion should have received more 
 
206. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 16.  The study 
also emphasized that Community-wide exhaustion “provides a higher economic reward to firms that 
invest in the quality or style of their products, and that this incentive is necessary in order to maintain 
the quality and style of products expected by consumers.” Id. 
207. Id. at 16. 
208. Id. 
209. Rhys et al., supra note 202, at 19. 
210. For a general overview, see Commission‟s web site at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/185.htm (last visited May 20, 2002).  These 
consultations raised the additional question of whether a change in the trademark exhaustion regime 
“could be discussed separately from the questions concerning exhaustion of other intellectual 
property rights.”  Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 15.  As 
pointed out by representatives of some Member States, “[p]roducts are in many cases protected not 
only by trademarks, but [also] by a multiple set of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) (copyright, 
patents, etc.).”  Communiqué from Commissioner Bolkestein on the Issue of Exhaustion of Trade 
Mark Rights, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comexhaust.htm 
(last visited May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Communiqué].  As reported by the Commission in the 
Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17, it was also held that the 
introduction of international exhaustion for trademarks would therefore affect only a limited number 
of sectors in a limited way. 
211. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 17-19. 
212. Id. 
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attention,”213 whereas the opponents of international exhaustion suggested that 
“the potential negative impacts on consumers caused by a change of regime 
had been played down.”214 
Consultations with interested parties also showed divergent positions on 
the issue.
215
  Industry representatives “emphasized the important role of trade 
marks and other intellectual property rights as incentives for innovation and 
research.”216  They observed that “international exhaustion would weaken the 
position of trade mark proprietors and have [negative] implications for their 
strategic [behavior], this in turn leading to losses in innovation, production 
and employment.”217 
In opposition, representatives of foreign associations, associations of 
parallel traders, and consumer organizations underlined the benefits that free 
trade could eventually provide.
218
  “[A]n international exhaustion regime 
would lower prices, increase product availability and increase consumption in 
the Community.”219  The opponents of international exhaustion argued that 
the introduction of new technologies (e.g., e-commerce) could give consumers 
access to a greater choice of products at lower prices.
220
  In addition, future 
expansion of the Community may also have considerable impact on the 
internal market by further lowering consumer prices.
221
  In this context, it was 
emphasized that the exhaustion regime for national trademarks and the 
Community trademark should be the same.
222
  Accordingly, a change to 
international exhaustion should apply to both systems.
223
 
In December 1999, the Commission published a working document to be 
discussed by the Council.
224
  This document examined four key exhaustion 
related issues: (1) the possible consequences of different regimes for national 
trademarks compared to Community trademarks, (2) the distinction between 
exhaustion regimes and different intellectual property rights, (3) the 
“differentiation of exhaustion regimes for different sectors of industry,” and 
(4) “international exhaustion through international agreements.”225 
 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 17-19. 
215. Id. at 18. 
216. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 18. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 19. 
220. Id. at 17. 
221. Communiqué, supra note 208. 
222. Id. 
223. Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
224. See generally id. 
225. Id. at 3. 
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In May 2000, the Commission concluded that a change from EEA 
exhaustion would not, at least in the short term, lead to a significant fall in 
consumer prices.  The Commission decided not to submit any proposal to 
alter the current system of exhaustion.
226
  These conclusions were based on 
the meetings with Member States and interested parties and on the results 
highlighted in the Commission‟s working document.  The Commission stated 
that “trademark policy has only a marginal effect on parallel trade.”227  This 
was in line with the position of trade association representatives and was in 
part the result of their well conducted lobbying activity.  “[O]ther elements, 
like distribution arrangements, transport costs, health and safety legislation, 
technical standards and labeling differences may have a greater, and more 
direct impact.”228 
The Commission then considered that “the exhaustion regime for 
trademark would have little effect on the marketplace, given the large 
majority of products that are covered by a [plurality] of intellectual property 
rights.”229  Community-wide exhaustion had been developed to foster the 
integration of the internal market.
230
  If the Community was to introduce 
international exhaustion and its trading partners did not do likewise, 
Community companies, including subsidiaries and distributors of non-
Community companies, would face a competitive disadvantage.
231
 
The debate on the issue was reignited in 2001.  On February 15, the 
European Community Parliament published a draft report entitled “The 
Problem of the Exhaustion of Trademark Rights,” once again advocating the 
transition to an international exhaustion regime.
232
  The rationale behind the 
request for a change in the current exhaustion regime continued to be that the 
absence of international exhaustion could lead to higher prices within the 
Community.  The report emphasized that the aim of trademark protection is to 
promote brand identity, not to allow trademark owners to rely on the right to 
prevent parallel importation by creating price differences and market barriers.  
In order to find a compromise with industry representatives, this report 
excluded pharmaceuticals from international exhaustion application.
233
  So 
 
226. Communiqué, supra note 208. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Communiqué, supra note 208.  While refusing a change in the current regime, the 
Commission did not take into account the arguments added to the debate by the High Court of 
London in the Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss cases pending at that time before the ECJ. 
232. See supra note 21. 
233. Id. 
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far, relevant legislative amendments to the current exhaustion regime have 
been neither discussed nor adopted by the Parliament.
234
 
In April 2001, the Swedish Presidency organized an informal seminar of 
internal market and consumer affairs ministers to reexamine the issue.
235
  
Once again, this meeting showed a profound division among the Member 
States.
236
  The only consensus reached during this seminar was that any 
change to the exhaustion regime of trademark rights should be considered 
according to its impact on employment, product quality and safety, and retail 
prices.  Because of the divergent approaches and the lack of consensus 
between Member States, trade organizations, and consumer associations, the 
question of whether international trademark exhaustion should apply in 
Europe is likely to continue to be at the center of discussion for a long time. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
There is apparently little hope left for those who favor international 
exhaustion in the European Union.  At least for the time being, the ECJ has 
made clear that EEA-wide exhaustion is the only applicable criterion within 
the internal market, and national rules providing other exhaustion regimes are 
in contrast with Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.  According to the 
ECJ, in order to guarantee free movement of goods within the European 
market, the same exhaustion regime should apply throughout the EEA.  
Interpretation of Article 7 at a national level should not contrast with the spirit 
of harmonization that characterizes the Trademark Directive.  The ECJ‟s 
rulings did not exclude the possibility for changes to the current exhaustion 
regime.  For the sake of harmonization and the smooth running of the internal 
market, any change should occur by a general consensus among Member 
States. 
 
234. Id. Because of the lack of consensus, the Parliament has called on the Commission in 
order to produce a study that examines (once again!) the legal and economic situation related to 
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However, because national approaches to international exhaustion 
diverge, future inconsistent case law on the issue should be expected.  
Although the intervention of the ECJ clarified the interpretation of Article 
7(1) as it has been underlined, its rulings are not technically binding for 
national courts.  In addition, the ECJ‟s rulings in “Affaire Hag” have shown 
that the Court can reverse itself while deciding trademark matters.  Even 
though its decisions have consistently been followed by domestic tribunals, 
this cannot prevent possible inconsistent judgments in the future. 
There is little doubt that the building of a “fortress Europe” represents a 
strategy.  It is a European “defense tower” that repels the aggressive 
commercial policies of other countries.
237
  Ideally, trade should be free and 
global.  Diplomatic negotiations in the WTO framework and the adoption of 
the TRIPS Agreement have proven that such “free and global trade” is still 
difficult in actual practice.  Because of the lack of consensus on the issue and 
the economic differences between developed and developing countries, the 
choice of whether or not to apply international trademark exhaustion still 
remains a matter for national legislators (Community legislators, in the case of 
Europe). 
The ECJ and the Commission have shown how the Community is not 
totally opposed to international exhaustion.  This gradual process could start 
on the basis of reciprocity agreements with third countries that guarantee 
Member States equal treatment of their exports in the states that are parties to 
agreements.  However, these agreements may represent a violation of the 
“most favored nation” principle as per Article 4 of TRIPS.  Because of this 
risk, the Community and other interested parties have continued to choose a 
protective policy (i.e., EEA-wide exhaustion) rather than adopt a liberal 
approach in favor of global trade.  As soon as other countries adopt 
international exhaustion, the Community will probably abandon its defensive 
tower.  Nevertheless, considering the strong pressure from international 
industries against international exhaustion, such change is not likely to happen 
in the near future.  Multi-national companies can rely on their trademark 
rights world-wide because of several national trademark registrations.  There 
is little doubt that they will try to prevent, by any means, the adoption of 
international exhaustion in Europe as well as in any other countries where 
they conduct their business. 
On the other hand, the adoption of international trademark exhaustion 
world-wide will not necessarily result in the creation of the regime with 
completely free and global trade that is so feared by trademark owners.  
Trademark owners will be able to prevent parallel importations of their 
products by placing reservations and restrictions on their licenses and by 
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placing labels on their product that explicitly prohibit exportation to other 
countries.  As the ECJ ruled, such restrictions might fall within the scope of 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty as a violation of competition law, but only under 
exceptional circumstances, such as when there are important price differences 
between the foreign market and the Community, a large volume of goods 
exported to that market, and when trademark owners have an oligopolistic 
position on the European market in the relevant goods.  Even in a regime of 
EEA-wide exhaustion, trademark owners may possibly rely on their exclusive 
rights to prevent parallel importation of genuine products under these 
circumstances.  This should be seen as an abuse of trademark protection and 
in conflict with the safeguards of market competition and consumer welfare. 
Finally, while international exhaustion appears to be banned from the 
European Union for the time being, there should be concern for the 
effectiveness of the EEA-wide exhaustion principle itself.  In recent cases 
about repackaged and relabeled products, the ECJ held that trademark rights 
are not exhausted, “even if that constitutes a barrier to intra-[C]ommunity 
trade,” when an unauthorized third party has been removing and then re-
affixing or replacing labels bearing the mark that was originally affixed to 
products by the trademark owner, unless “the relabeling cannot affect the 
original condition of the product; the presentation of the relabeled product is 
not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trademark and its 
owner; and the person who relabels the products informs the trademark owner 
of the relabeling before the relabeled products are put on sale.”238 
Considering the traditional antagonism of trademark owners towards the 
principle of trademark exhaustion, whether national, EEA-wide, or 
international, there are no doubts that they will use and misinterpret the ECJ 
statements to their advantage in order to control the further commercialization 
of their products in the internal market.  Once again, it should be remembered 
that the “specific subject matter” and the primary function of a trademark is 
that of a source indicator. Consumer protection is the primary concern.  
Protection of the trademark owner is a secondary concern.  It is difficult to 
draw the thin line that divides “legitimate use” and “illegitimate abuse” of 
intellectual property rights when confronting trademark exhaustion.  
However, it should not be forgotten that any abuse of trademark protection 
will entail unwelcome consequences for the marketplace sooner or later. 
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